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Michigan's Binding Summary Jury
Trial: Reward or Punishment?
Farleigh v. Amalgamated Transit Union, Local 12511
I. INTRODUCTION
Ultimately, the purpose of law, lawyers, courts, and judges is to administer
justice. As our society becomes increasingly litigious, judges and scholars have
begun to realize that justice is not always best served in the traditional courtroom
setting.' In an effort to bring the legal practice back in line with the quest for
justice, courts have set intermediate goals to promote voluntary settlement by
parties? The summary jury trial has proved effective as a means to
accomplishing such intermediate goals.4
In 1988, the Michigan Supreme Court added the summary jury trial to its
arsenal of settlement devices available to trial judges.' Unfortunately, the
summary jury trial employed in Farleigh v. Amalgamated Transit Union, Local
1251 failed to meet its goal, and no settlement was reached by the parties.6
Nevertheless, the Michigan Court of Appeals chose to enforce the summary jury
verdict,7 thereby drawing into question not only the ability of the summary jury
trial to meet the preliminary goal of promoting settlement, but also the larger goal
of the accomplishment of justice.
HI. FACTS AND HOLDING
Rachel Farleigh [hereinafter Farleigh] filed suit against Amalgamated Transit
Union, Local 1251 [hereinafter Union], alleging that she was denied membership
in the union in retaliation for an earlier sexual harassment claim that she filed
against a union leader.' The parties went through a mediation process in which
an evaluation of the denial of membership was made by a neutral third party.9
1. 502 N.W.2d 371 (Mich. Ct App. 1993).
2. Senator Charles E. Grassley & Charles Pou, Jr., Congress, The Executive Branch and the
Dispute Resolution Process, 1992 J. DISP. RESOL 1, 3.
3. Id. at 7.
4. Hugh W. Brenneman, Jr. & Edward Wesoloski, Blueprint for a Summary Jury Trial, 65
Mic- BAP, J. 888, 888 (1986).
5. Michigan Administrative Order # 1988-2, MICa- REPORTS CT. RULES, at Al-33 (1993).
6. Farleigh, 502 N.W.2d at 372.
7. Id at 374.
8. Id. at 372.
9. Id
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Farleigh rejected the $10,000 mediation award in her favor."° Subsequently, the
parties participated in a summary jury trial, which resulted in an advisory verdict
of no cause of action." Based on this finding, the Union moved pursuant to
Michigan Court Rule 2.109(A) 2 and requested that the court require Farleigh to
post a bond in the amount of $45,000." The Union asserted that the bond would
cover their costs if the plaintiff failed to recover at least ten percent more than the
mediation award.' 4 The trial judge granted the motion, but only required the
plaintiff to post a $15,000 bond, an amount reflecting the Union's attorney's fees
incurred after the mediation." Subsequently, the court dismissed Farleigh's
cause of action based on her failure to post the court ordered bond.'
6
Farleigh appealed, claiming that the trial judge abused his discretion by
ordering the bond and dismissing the case.' 7 The appellate court affirmed the
trial court's ruling, holding that although the discretion of the trial judge generally
extends only to matters of law, the discretionary bond and subsequent dismissal
were appropriate since the summary jury trial had tested the merits of the case.'"
H1. LEGAL BACKGROUND
A. Michigan's Bond Law
The Michigan Rules of Civil Procedure allow for the filing of a bond "[oin
Motion of a party against whom a claim has been asserted in a civil action, if it
appears reasonable and proper. . . . "' This rule was adopted in order to
minimize the burdens imposed on litigants caused by frivolous claims.2 0 The
court is empowered to dismiss a lawsuit for failure to pay the security bond.2'
Michigan courts have historically demanded bonds of this nature where: (1) the
claim is based on a tenuous legal theory; or (2) the claim is based on groundless
10. Id.
11. Id
12. MICK CT. R. 2.109(A) provides in pertinent part:
On Motion of a party against whom a claim has been asserted in a civil action, if it
appears reasonable and proper, the court may order the opposing party to file with the
court clerk a bond with surety as required by the court in an amount sufficient to cover
all costs and other recoverable expenses that may be awarded by the trial court ...
The court shall determine the amount in its discretion.
Id.





18. Id at 373.
19. Micu CT. R. 2.109(A). See supra note 12.
20. Louya v. William Beaumont Hosp., 475 N.W.2d 434, 437 n.4 (Mich. CL App. 1991).
21. Hall v. Harmony Hills Recreation, Inc., 463 N.W.2d 254, 258 (Mich. Ct. App. 1990).
[Vol. 1994, No. I
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allegations.22 However, the same standards are not applied when a motion to
post a bond is based on challenging a party's factual assertions, rather than their
legal theories.23
A party seeking a bond based on a tenuous theory of liability need only
provide the court with a substantial reason showing the necessity of the bond.24
On the other hand, a motion requesting a bond based on groundless allegations
must meet a higher standard, although Michigan courts have not explicitly
delineated this standard. 5 Michigan courts have traditionally invoked a strong
presumption against requiring the posting of a bond based on the merits of a
claim, rather than on the legal theories involved.26 Courts have also held that
this standard is not so stringent as to rise to the level required by a motion for
judgment as a matter of law.2"
In Wells v. FruehaufCorp.,28 the defendant moved for the posting of a bond
based "primarily on the dubious merit of [the] plaintiff's claims."29  The
plaintiff's claim was one of simple negligence resulting from an auto accident, but
when pressed to support her case, the plaintiff was unable to produce any
evidence.3" As a result, the trial court ordered that a bond be posted.3
Subsequently, the appeals court upheld the decision based on an "abuse of
discretion" standard of review.
32
In the past, Michigan courts have addressed acceptable sources for judging
the merits of a claim in relation to a motion to post a bond.33 In Louya v.
William Beaumont Hospital,34 the Michigan Court of Appeals, in dicta, found
that the trial judge would have erred in requiring the plaintiff to post a bond.35
In Louya, the original counsel for the plaintiff had grown disenchanted with his
client's obstetrical malpractice claim.36 When questioned by the court regarding
his reasons for withdrawal, the plaintiffs counsel stated that he thought the
plaintiff's cause could not prevail at trial."' The appellate court determined that
the judge would have exceeded his discretion by relying on the opinion of an
22. Id. at 256; Zapalski v. Benton, 444 N.W.2d 171, 174 (Mich. CL App. 1989).
23. Hall, 463 N.W.2d at 257.
24. Wells v. Fruehauf Corp., 428 N.W.2d 1, 5 (Mich. Ct. App. 1988).
25. Hall, 463 N.W.2d at 257; Wells, 428 N.W.2d at 6.
26. Hall, 463 N.W.2d at 257; Wells, 428 N.W.2d at 6.
27. Hall, 463 N.W.2d at 256; Wells, 428 N.W.2d at 5.




32. Id. at 6.
33. Louya, 475 N.W.2d at 439.
34. 475 N.W.2d 434.
35. Id. at 439.
36. Id at 435.
37. Id at 438.
1994]
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attorney, who was seeking to withdraw from the case, when weighing the merits
of the claim."'
In Hall v. Harmony Hills Recreation, Inc.,3 the court noted that it was
improper to evaluate a motion to post bond based solely on impressions gained
during proceedings that were eventually declared a mistrial.4 In Hall, following
a mistrial based on jury bias, a "slip-and-fall" plaintiff was ordered to post a bondprior to a second trial. 41 The appellate court determined that the trial judge had
not only abused his discretion in considering the previous mistrial, but that the
court should have "limited [its inquiry] to the plaintiff's pleading."42
B. The Summary Jury Trial
The summary jury triaV' was originally created by Federal District Judge
Thomas D. Lambros in 1980 as a settlement technique to relieve pressure on the
court's docket." Since that time, the procedure has gained popularity in many
federal district courts because of its promise of decreased court costs and
decreased time invested in litigation.45  As more courts have incorporated the
procedure, scholars have begun to consider the value of binding" summary jury
trials.
4 7
38. Id at 439-40.
39. 463 N.W.2d 254.
40. Id at 256-58.
41. Id at 255.
42. Id at 257.
43. For a detailed discussion of the summary jury trial procedure, see Thomas D. Lambros,
The Summary Jury Tral and Other Alternative Methods of Dispute Resolution, 103 F.R.D. 461,
470-71 (1984).
44. A. Leo Levin & Deirdre Golash, Alternative Dispute Resolution in Federal District
Courts, 37 U. FLA. . REV. 29 (1995).
45. Lambros, supra note 43, at 475. This sentiment is echoed by numerous other sources:
"[Courts] can spend more time on the resolution of civil controversies rather than on the numbing
oversight of a process fraught with delay, discord, and even boredom." Barry C. Schneider,
Summary Jury Trials with Ceilings and Floors, LmaL, Summer 1991, at 3.
46. This Note distinguishes between binding summary jury trials, where the parties
voluntarily agree to be bound by the jury's decision, and mandatory summary jury trials, where
judges have compelled participation in the procedure.
47. Thomas B. Metzloff, Reconfiguring the Summary Jury Tral, 41 DUKE L.J. 806 passim
(1992); Schneider, supra note 45, at 3. Much of the initial debate on summary jury trials has
focused on the courts' authority to compel jurors to serve on summary juries, (See, e.g., United
States v. Exum, 744 F. Supp. 803 (N.D. Ohio 1990); Charles W. Hatfield, Note, The Summary
Jury Tral: Who Will Speak for the Jurors? 1991 . Disp. REsOL 151), and the courts' authority to
require parties to participate. (See Lambros, supra note 43, at 469; but see Charles F. Webber,
Mandatory Summary Jury Thal: Playing by the Rules?, 56 U. CHI L REv. 1495 (1989)).
Although these issues remain unresolved, [See Strandell v. Jackson County, 838 F.2d 884 (7th Cir.
1987) (holding that the court could not require the summary jury trial); c.f. Arabian Am. Oil v.
Scarfone, 119 F.R.D. 448 (M.D. Fla. 1988); Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis v. Carey-
Canada, Inc., 123 F.R.D. 603 (D. Minn. 1988); McKay v. Ashland Oil, Inc., 120 F.R.D. 43 (E.D.
Ky. 1988) (holding that the courts can require participation in the summary jury trial)], the debate
4
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One key aspect of Judge Lambros' original plan for the summary jury trial
was that "[tihe proceeding is not binding and in no way affects the parties' rights
to a full trial on the merits."41 Judge Lambros indicated that "counsel may
stipulate that a consensus verdict will be deemed a final determination on the
merits and that judgment may be entered by the Court. This, however, is
optional."49 Many courts have determined that altering this aspect of the plan,
without the consent of the parties, would adversely affect the procedure.5 °
In Russell v. PPG Industries, Inc.,51 the plaintiff's counsel on appeal sought
to bolster his position before the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh
Circuit by citing "information from a summary jury trial in which the parties had
participated."5 2 The court of appeals took for granted that the proceeding was
nonbinding, and that it could not be commented upon because "[tihe potential for
risk in this 'no-risk' procedure would increase significantly if... information
gleaned from the process [could be] used in later proceedings. 0
The "no-risk" nature of a summary jury trial was also reviewed in McKay v.
Ashland Oil, Inc.14 In holding that a trial judge could compel a summary jury
trial," the McKay court noted that the summary jury trial resembled a nonbinding
arbitration where "[n]o presumption of correctness attaches to the verdict of the
summary jury, nor is [there] any sanction imposed for failure to accept its advisory
verdict."56 The McKay court concluded by questioning whether a mandatory,
binding summary jury trial would be authorized under the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure.57
The Michigan Supreme Court, in authorizing the use of summary jury trials
in Administrative Order Number 1988-2, 5' reiterated their nonbinding effect:
Unless the parties stipulate otherwise, the verdict is advisory only. The
parties may stipulate that a consensus verdict will be deemed a final
determination on the merits and that judgment may be entered on the
verdict by the Court, or may stipulate to any other use of the verdict
that will aid in the resolution of the case. 9
over summary jury trials has begun to focus upon the nonbinding nature of the proceeding. See,
e.g., Metzloff, supra.
48. Lambros, supra note 43, at 469.
49. Id at 471.
50. See, e.g., Russell v. PPG Industries, Inc., 953 F.2d 326, 334 (7th Cir. 1992).
51. 953 F.2d 326.
52. Id at 333.
53. Id at 334.
54. 120 F.R.D. 43 (E.D. Ky. 1988).
55. Id at 44.
56. Id at 46.
57. Id (citing Colgrove v. Battin, 413 U.S. 149 (1973)).
58. See supra note 5.
59. Mich. Admin. Order # 1988-2 (4). See supra note 5.
1994]
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The basic procedure of the Michigan summaryjury trial conforms to the procedure
outlined by Judge Lambros,6° including the suggestion that the parties consider
a prior stipulation to a binding summary jury trial.
The summary jury trial is not without its critics, including practitioners.62
In response to lawyers' complaints that the process is too expensive and that the
verdicts are not truly predictive,63 a growing number of commentators have
opined that parties should be encouraged to make the summary jury trial
binding64 by the prior consent of both participants.65 Judges, including Judge
Lambros, have also promoted this notion as a practical matter by trying to steer
parties to this new form of dispute resolution.66
The binding summary jury trial affords many advantages not realized by the
parties under the classic nonbinding method.6" Parties are not forced to
participate in the potentially expensive and unproductive post-trial negotiation
required under the original approach. 6' Additionally, the risk of a subsequent full
trial is eliminated.69  Finally, stipulation to a binding proceeding offers even
more advantages when combined with other procedural alterations.70
60. Lambros, supra note 43, at 471.
61. Mich. Admin. Order # 1988-2. See supra note 5. The official interpretation of the order
refers to an article discussing traditional, nonbinding summary jury trials. Id See Brenneman,
supra note 4, at 892.
62. See, e.g., Richard A. Posner, The Summary Jury Trial and Other Methods of Alternative
Dispute Resolution: Some Cautionary Observations, 53 U. CHL L REV. 366 (1986); Shirley A.
Wiegand, A New Light Bulb or the Work of the Devil? A Current Assessment of Summary Jury
Trials, 69 OR. L. REV. 87 (1990).
63. Schneider, supra note 45, at 3.
64. Negin v. City of Mentor, Ohio, 601 F. Supp. 1502, 1505 (N.D. Ohio 1985); Schneider,
supra note 45, at 3. "Although at first blush binding [summary jury trials] may seem inconsistent
with its purpose and structure, a binding approach overcomes most of the current criticisms of the
[summary jury trial]." Metzloff, supra note 47, at 807.
65. Metzloff, supra note 47, at 859. "[Blecause parties must voluntarily agree to a binding
[summary jury trial], the continuing debate over judicial authority to mandate its use is not an
issue." Id. at 859 n.192.
66. See Associated Pa. Constr. v. Jannetta, 738 F. Supp. 891 (M.D. Pa. 1990); Negin, 601 F.
Supp. at 1502 (Lambros, J.).
67. See generally Metzloff, supra note 47.
68. Metzloff, supra note 47, at 857.
69. Id.
70. The most commonly discussed of these is the pre-negotiated minimum and maximum
acceptable summary jury verdict. This serves to minimize each parties' risk by adding a degree of
predictability to the proceedings. Schneider, supra note 45, at 3-4.
[Vol. 1994, No. I
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IV. THE INSTANT DECISION
In Farleigh v. Amalgamated Transit Union, Local 125 1,71 the Michigan
Court of Appeals held that a trial court must have a substantial reason to require
a party to post a bond for costs."2 Substantial reasons may include the assertion
of a tenuous legal theory or the belief that the parties' allegations are groundless
and unwarranted. 73 The Farleigh court determined that the substantial reason for
requiring the bond in the instant case was the lack of factual support for the
plaintiff's claim.74 The basis for this finding was the result of a previously held
summary jury trial, and more specifically, the speed in which that jury determined
that the claim lacked factual support.75
The Farleigh court first determined that the plaintiff's ability to post a bond
should be incorporated into the trial court's decision regarding the bond by
balancing the relative ability to pay against the reason for the bond, and then noted
that when a trial court considers a plaintiff's financial status, the result is often a
reduction in the amount of the bond. 76 In ruling on a defendant's motion to post
a bond for failure to state a meritorious claim, the court must consider an indigent
plaintiff's interest in free access to the courts to be less if her pleadings state a
tenuous legal theory.77
The Farleigh court reaffined that the decision to require the bond rested on
the suit's lack of merit as evidenced by the summary jury verdict.78 The court
remarked that this case was unusual because of the opportunity provided by the
summary jury trial to test the merits of the claim.79 The Farleigh court noted
that this unusual opportunity served to distinguish the case from Hall, where the
trial court was restricted to consideration of the pleadings because the only other
ground for requiring a bond was a mistrial.
The Farleigh court concluded by praising the summary jury trial for its
ability to both educate the trial judge on the merits of the claim and weed out
frivolous suits.81 Based on these findings, the Michigan Court of Appeals found
that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in requiring the plaintiff to post a
bond based on the findings of a summary jury trial.82
71. 502 N.W.2d 371.
72. Id. at 372.
73. Id. at 372-73 (citing Wells, 428 N.W.2d at 1).
74. Id. at 373.
75. Id. Summary juries are given abbreviated instructions and encouraged to complete their
deliberation quickly. Lambros, supra note 43, at 471.
76. Farleigh, 502 N.W.2d at 373.
77. Id. (quoting Hall, 463 N.W.2d at 272).
78. Id.
79. Id.
80. Id. at 373 n.4.
81. Id. at 374.
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V. COMMENT
A. Michigan's Bond Law
By requiring Farleigh to post a bond, the trial court effectively eliminated a
claim that it believed to be without merit. In affirming this decision, the appellate
court reaffirmed that this was consistent with the goals of Michigan's bond
requirement.m The decision serves to clarify the hazy requirements for posting
a bond based on the merits of a case, rather than on legal theory.' Prior cases
based on allegedly meritless claims had established a quasi-presumption against
granting motions to post bond in such cases.8 5 As a result, few litigants have
rebutted this presumption. 6 Farleigh eases this presumption by showing one
way in which it can be rebutted. When faced with a motion to post bond, the
Farleigh decision now allows judges to consider another source in determining
whether a claim lacks merit. Where past law had limited trial judges to
considerations as narrow as the pleadings,' Farleigh expands the judge's scope
of inquiry. Now, a Michigan trial judge can consider the proceedings of a
summary jury trial, a nonbinding settlement technique, to make a decision that is
often tantamount to dismissal.
B. Nonbinding Summary Jury Trials
Since the official interpretation of the Michigan rule concerning summary
jury trials depicts a nonbinding, voluntary approach to summary jury trials,' the
Farleigh court's reliance on such a proceeding to hinder the plaintiffs progress
through the trial court system is anomalous. A summary jury trial is no longer a
procedure without impact on subsequent legal proceedings. Unlike many federal
district court rules," the Michigan Supreme Court's rule allows only for
voluntary summary jury trials." After Farleigh, it is likely that few Michigan
attorneys will be willing to stipulate to this "nonbinding" procedure, since it could
subsequently result in either being required to post a bond or in dismissal. 9' If,
83. Zapalski, 444 N.W.2d at 174.
84. See supra notes 19-42 and accompanying text.
85. Hall, 463 N.W.2d at 257; Wells, 428 N.W.2d at 6.
86. See, e.g., Wells, 428 N.W.2d 1.
87. Hall, 463 N.W.2d at 257.
88. See supra note 61.
89. See, e.g., Local Rule 23 of the Joint Local Rules for the United States District Courts of
the Eastern and Western Districts of Kentucky (cited in McKay, 120 F.RD. at 44).
90. Mich. Admin. Order # 1988-2 (4). See supra note 5.
91. Russell, 953 F.2d at 334. "Were we to allow parties to offer information from the
summary jury trial ... its utility as a settlement device would be significantly undermined and
parties' willingness to participate in the process substantially decreased." Id.
.[Vol. 1994, No. I
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as a result, the procedure goes unused, it seems unlikely that its goal of decreasing
the burdens on the judicial system would be achieved.
Assuming that the procedure is of some use, enforcement of the verdict,
through requiring the losing party to post a bond, could undermine the traditional
nonbinding effect of summary jury trials.' If claimants submit to the procedure,
as modified by the Farleigh court, parties may ask for lengthier presentation times
to guard against a later bond requirement. Furthermore, the parties are not
actually bound to the summary jury verdict.93 Parties that are able to post bond,
or otherwise avoid the requirement,94 could still demand a full trial, resulting in
even more litigation, time, and expense than a standard jury trial without a
previous summary jury trial.
Perhaps the most unusual aspect of the Farleigh court's decision is its
reliance on the speed with which the sunimary jury returned its verdict.95  A
universally recognized advantage of the summary jury trial has been its ability to
reduce pressure on overburdened court dockets by decreasing the amount of time
devoted to the procedure.96 Summary jury trials are often carefully scheduled for
a morning session in order to encourage the jury to complete their deliberations
and render a verdict in one day.' With this precept in mind, the Farleigh
court's subsequent reliance upon the length of the jury's deliberations seems
misplaced.
C. Binding Summary Jury Trials
Rather than adhering to the traditional, nonbinding approachto summary jury
trials, the Farleigh court is attempting to steer Michigan courts toward the newer,
binding approach to summary jury trials.98 A binding approach to summary jury
trials has been espoused by some commentators as increasing the effectiveness of
the summary jury trial, as well as answering many of the criticisms of the classic,
nonbinding approach.99 In a binding summary jury trial, litigants give up the
guarantees of full trial procedure"° in exchange for the reward of a quick
settlement at low costs.'' Under the traditional, nonbinding summary jury trial,
courts attempt to promote voluntary settlement through the threat of a full-blown
trial."0 2 Instead of using either of these positive or negative re-enforcement
approaches, the Farleigh court instead opted to use aspects of both a binding and
92. Lambros, supra note 43, at 463.
93. Mich. Admin. Order # 1988-2 (4). See supra note 5.
94. For example, by a showing of indigency. See MICi CT. R. 2.109(C).
95. Farleigh, 502 N.W.2d at 373.
96. Lambros, supra note 43, at 463; Brenneman, supra note 4, at 888.
97. Brenneman, supra note 4, at 888.
98. See supra notes 62-70 and accompanying text.
99. Metzloff, supra note 47, at 807.
100. Id. at 860.
101. Id. at 857.
102. Id. at 858
19941
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a nonbinding procedure. In so doing, the court punished Farleigh by denying her
a trial, rather than subjecting her to the unpleasant aspects associated with a trial.
Another advantage to binding summary jury trials is that they assure that
courts will not be involved in further litigation of the matter.'03 "[O]ne of the
primary procedural rights that the parties forego in a binding [summary jury trial]
is the right to pursue post-trial remedies, such as the right to file an appeal.'
0 4
As already discussed, the parties in Farleigh did not give up this right.' 5 A
trial was avoided by the motion to post bond, rather than as a direct result of the
summary jury trial. Indeed, the question of judicial economy in this case must be
considered in light of the appeal as well.
Regardless of whether the Farleigh court endorsed the binding or nonbinding
approach to summary jury trials, it is inconsistent with the parties' stipulation that
the summary jury trial verdict would have no binding effect.'06 Prior to
Farleigh, "it has never been suggested that the [results from a summary jury trial]
should be admissible at a subsequent, conventional trial, or that the court system
should impose a penalty on litigants who insist upon a traditional trial."'0 7
Voluntary submission to the summary jury verdict has always been the primary
emphasis of binding summary jury trials.'O In Farleigh, the court chose not
only to allow the consideration of the summary jury verdict in subsequent
proceedings, but also considered the brevity of the jury's deliberation in a
procedure designed to emphasize speed.' 0 9
VI. CONCLUSION
The nonbinding summary jury trial has to some degree proven to be an
effective tool for the promotion of settlements in federal district courts. As more
states experiment with the procedure, commentators have begun to question
whether the larger goal of speedy and just resolution of disputes is served by
promotion of this form of voluntary settlement. Binding summary jury trials have
been offered as one method of meeting this goal. However, to this point, only the
Farleigh decision has given effect to the verdict of a summary jury without the
prior consent of the litigants.
THOMAS G. GuCK
103. Id. at 860
104. Id.
105. Farleigh, 502 N.W.2d at 371.
106. Id. at 372.
107. Metzloff, supra note 47, at 810 n. 11.
108. Russell, 953 F.2d at 333.
109. Farleigh, 502 N.W.2d at 373.
[Vol. 1994, No. I
10
Journal of Dispute Resolution, Vol. 1994, Iss. 1 [1994], Art. 16
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/jdr/vol1994/iss1/16
